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AIMS
To evaluate the ability of electronic patient medication record (ePMR)
systems used in community pharmacies in England to detect and alert
users about clinical hazards, errors and other safety problems.
METHODS
Between September 2012 and November 2012, direct on-site
observational data about the performance of ePMR systems were
collected from nine sites. Twenty-eight scenarios were developed by
consensus agreement between a general practitioner and two
community pharmacists. Each scenario was entered into the ePMR
system, and the results obtained from the assessment of six unique
systems in nine sites, in terms of the presence or absence of an alert,
were recorded onto a prespecified form.
RESULTS
None of the systems produced the correct responses for all of the 28
scenarios tested. Only two systems provided an alert to penicillin
sensitivity. No dose or frequency check was observed when processing
a prescription for methotrexate. One system did not warn about
nonsuitability of aspirin prescribed to a child of 14 years of age. In
another system, it was not possible to record a patient’s pregnancy
status. None of the six systems provided any warning for diclofenac
overdose, high initiation dose of morphine sulfate or significant dose
increase. Only one of the systems did not produce any spurious alerts.
CONCLUSIONS
The performance of the ePMR systems tested was variable and
suboptimal. The findings suggest the need for minimum specifications
and standards for ePMR systems to ensure consistency of performance.
WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ABOUT
THIS SUBJECT
• Electronic patient medication record (ePMR)
systems provide alerts about potential drug
interactions between previously dispensed
and newly prescribed medication.
• It has been suggested that there are
problems, such as false alerts and
overalerting.
WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS
• This study evaluated the ability of ePMR
systems used in community pharmacies in
England to alert users about
medication-related hazards and errors.
• Alerts are not adequately implemented in
most ePMR systems.
• Current systems are unreliable in
highlighting clinically significant prescribing
hazards other than drug–drug interactions
and co-prescriptions.
• Pharmacists should not be over-reliant on
ePMR systems in their current state of
maturity.
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Introduction
Pharmacists take numerous steps to ensure the safety of
medications and patients in their care. These steps include
checking prescriptions and dispensing labels for accuracy,
ensuring suitability of medications, doses and directions,
and assessing prescriptions for potential problems, such
as interactions with other medications and drug allergies.
These facilitate reduction in medication errors and
dispensing of potentially hazardous drugs and unsafe
co-prescriptions [1, 2].
In a recent retrospective case record review study of
1000 adults who died in 2009 in 10 acute hospitals in
England, a wide range of problems were identified in
patients whose death was judged as preventable. Unac-
ceptable fluid levels and medication problems, such as
side-effects, inappropriate use, failure to give prophylactic
care and anaphylaxis accounted for 21.1% of the most
frequent problems [3]. Wrong dose, frequency, route or
quantity, mismatching between patient and medicine,
allergy, contraindication and adverse drug reaction have
also been identified as errors arising from medication use
[4]. Recent work that investigated medication error in
general practices in England showed that one in eight
patients is subject to a medication error [5]. To achieve
improvements in medication and patient safety, the
World Health Organization reiterates the requirement for
a wide range of actions such as performance improve-
ment, risk management, and provision of a safe health-
care environment, encompassing appropriate use of
medicines, equipment safety and safe clinical practice [6].
In the UK, at the time of writing this article, themajority
of prescriptions presented to community pharmacies are
paper based and these require re-entry of the order into
the electronic patient medication record (ePMR) system. A
new service, the Electronic Prescription Service (EPS), has
been introduced and is being deployed through two key
releases. The service allows for electronic transmission of
prescriptions from the general practice (GP) surgery to the
pharmacy, which means that in those cases, it is possible
for the ePMR system to be populated with information
automatically from GP systems, but this is still in the roll-
out phase and not in widespread use. Pharmacists use
their knowledge, with the support of ePMR systems
embedded with safety features, to complete their assess-
ment of prescribed medication. Clinical and professional
reasons have both been cited as some of the reasons for
installing ePMR systems by pharmacy companies [7]. Pre-
vious studies have shown ePMR systems to be useful
in alerting pharmacists to potential drug interactions
between previously dispensed and newly prescribed
medication [8].
In many countries around the world, the sensitivity and
specificity of safety warnings, the way in which they are
presented, what a user gets warned about, and the cat-
egory and severity level of alerts are some of the areas
where variations and problems exist in ePMR systems
[9–14]. Other problems include missing alerts, inadequate
alert information and false alerts. Overalerting as a result
of delays in implementation of prescribing guidance
updates, beneficial therapeutic duplication of medica-
tions, such as antihypertensives, and use of multiple drug
strengths to personalize drug regimens could lead to ‘alert
fatigue’ and automatic behaviour towards alerts without
consideration of the implications [9, 12, 15, 16]. Technolo-
gies such as ePMR systems have also been known to intro-
duce new errors, such as separation of functions that
facilitate double dosing and incompatible orders and frag-
mented displays that prevent a coherent view of patients’
medications [17].
A proactive approach to safety is required in the iden-
tification and prevention of potential medication errors
and harm to patients [18]. Even though the performance of
safety features and alerts in hospital and community phar-
macy ePMR systems in some countries is well documented
[9, 11–14, 19, 20], such data about community pharmacy
ePMR systems in England do not exist. Over one billion
prescription items were dispensed in the community in
England in 2012 [21]. This number has been steadily
increasing over recent years, with greater potential for
medication errors as the number of medicines dispensed
increases. This increased number of medicines also pre-
sents huge opportunities and challenges for pharmacists,
to stop errors and harm to patients. In addition, the dis-
pensing stage of the medication use process is usually the
last opportunity to stop an error from passing through
to the patient in primary care and should remain invulner-
able [22].
This study aimed to evaluate the ability of ePMR
systems, used in community pharmacies in England, to
detect and alert users to a sample of clinically hazardous
interactions, errors and problems during pharmacy order
entry. Currently, there is no minimum specification for the
clinical functionality of ePMR systems used in community
pharmacies in England. In this study, we examined systems
that have been approved by the National Health Service in
England. All these systems have to be capable of using EPS
Release 2 (R2) [23].
Methods
This study was part of a larger observational study in
eight community pharmacies, exploring the use of ePMR
systems and alerts in the practice setting. Firstly, we
approached community pharmacies in the Nottingham-
shire area, UK. The pharmacies were invited, with permis-
sion from their superintendent pharmacists, by post or tel-
ephone, to participate in the observational study. The
assessment took place in the eight community pharmacies
that agreed to participate in the observational study.
All but one of the ePMR systems were tested in these com-
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munity pharmacies. We identified an extra ePMR system,
and this system was supplied by the vendor and tested in
a demonstration setting. This sample represented all six
ePMR systems available in community pharmacies in
England in August 2012. Direct, on-site observational data
were collected between September 2012 and November
2012. The names of the ePMR systems have been
anonymized as S1–S6 to preserve ePMR system and
vendor anonymity.
Test scenarios
Prespecified scenarios against which the ePMR systems
were to be evaluatedwere developed to test prompting of
clinically important events or the spurious alerting of
nonclinically important events. Scenarios were devised
by consensus agreement between a general practitioner
and two community pharmacists following a review
of primary literature; guidance from the British National
Formulary 63 [24] and Summary of Product Characteri-
stics. These scenarios included appropriate alerts when
contraindicated drugs or hazardous drug–drug combina-
tions were entered into the ePMR systems. The response of
the ePMR system was recorded as ‘yes’ where an alert was
generated or ‘no’ if the ePMR system did not produce an
alert.
Twenty-eight scenarios were used to check for drug–
drug interactions, other hazardous situations where evi-
dence exists that an ePMR system should alert the user
about potential errors and harm during order entry, and
spurious alerts. These scenarios included various patient
demographics and conditions such as hypertension,
asthma and rheumatoid arthritis. Some of the scenarios
were adapted from previous studies described elsewhere
[12, 25]. Tables 1–3 show the clinical rationale for each of
the scenarios tested. The scenarios in Tables 1 and 2 are
potentially hazardous based on the clinical rationale out-
lined above and should trigger an alert in the ePMR
system. The scenarios in Table 3 should not trigger an alert.
These include scenarios where other drugs in the class
have clinically significant interactions but the test drug
does not, or as a result of concomitant use being down-
graded due to new evidence.
Rationale for the test scenarios
The rationale for the tests is described in Tables 1–3. The
first set of tests, described in Table 1, was designed to
test the performance of ePMR systems with respect
to checking drug–drug interactions and hazardous
co-prescriptions. The second set, described in Table 2, was
designed to test information that could have been pro-
vided either from the prescription or from the patient
medication recordwithout recourse directly to the general
practitioner. The third set, described in Table 3, looked at
the potential for overalerting. Allergies and pregnancy
data are not routinely communicated directly on pre-
scriptions. Nevertheless, pharmacists may be aware of this
information directly from the patient and would expect to
receive appropriate alerts if the information was recorded
in the ePMR system.
Test process
One researcher (OO) visited each participating pharmacy
at a mutually convenient time to collect relevant data
about the performance of their pharmacy’s ePMR system.
Dummy patient data and the scenarios were entered into
the ePMR system. All scenarios were tested on each of the
Table 1
Clinical scenarios involving hazardous co-prescriptions and interactions
Test Dispensing scenario (alert expected = Yes) Rationale
A1 Sildenafil prescribed to a patient who is also receiving a nitrate Sildenafil significantly enhances hypotensive effect of nitrates; avoid concomitant use
A2 Ciprofloxacin prescribed to a patient who is taking ciclosporin Increased risk of nephrotoxicity when quinolones are given with ciclosporin
A3 Clarithromycin prescribed to a patient who is taking digoxin Macrolides increase plasma concentration of digoxin; increased risk of toxicity
A4 Erythromycin prescribed to a patient who is taking simvastatin, with no
evidence that the patient has been advised to stop the simvastatin
whilst taking the antibiotic
Increased risk of myopathy when simvastatin is given with erythromycin
A5 Ibuprofen prescribed to a patient who is taking lithium carbonate Excretion of lithium is reduced by nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs; increased risk of
toxicity
A6 Verapamil prescribed to a patient who is taking atenolol Taking verapamil with β-blocker may lead to severe hypotension and heart failure
A7 Naproxen prescribed to a patient who is taking warfarin Anticoagulant effect of coumarins is possibly enhanced by nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory
drugs
A8 Tagamet prescribed to a patient who is taking warfarin Metabolism of coumarins is inhibited by cimetidine, the active ingredient in Tagamet,
leading to enhanced anticoagulant effect
A9 Fluvastatin prescribed to a patient who is taking warfarin Fluvastatin enhances the anticoagulant effect of coumarins
A10 Microgynon prescribed to a patient who is on carbamazepine Carbamazepine accelerates the metabolism of estrogens; reduced contraceptive effect
A11 St John’s Wort prescribed to a patient who is taking fluoxetine Increased serotonergic effects when fluoxetine is given with St John’s Wort; avoid
concomitant use
A12 Tramacet prescribed to a patient who is taking paracetamol Tramacet contains tramadol and paracetamol. Duplication of paracetamol and increased
risk of paracetamol toxicity
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systems once. In the scenarios we used, the dosage
instructions were created using the ePMR system’s dose
codes and so we would expect the ePMR system to be
capable of recognizing an error. Data were recorded on
predesigned data-extraction sheets. Where a scenario
required a historical medication record for an assessment,
entry of any ‘newly prescribed’ medication was done at
least 1 day after the initial entry of the ‘historical’ medica-
tion. Correct response was recorded if an alert was pre-
sented on screen when an alert was expected, or an alert
Table 2
Clinical scenarios in relation to drug-allergies, contraindications, inappropriate doses, drug-route suitability, high-dose initiation of medicines and signifi-
cant dose increase
Test Dispensing scenario tested (alert expected = Yes) Rationale
B. Drug allergy
B1 Fluarix vaccine prescribed to a patient with egg allergy Summary of Product Characteristics: contraindicated.
British National Formulary: individuals with a history of egg allergy can be immunized
with either an egg-free influenza vaccine, if available, or an influenza vaccine with
an ovalbumin content <120 ng ml−1 (facilities should be available to treat
anaphylaxis). The ovalbumin content of Fluarix is <100 ng ml−1
B2 Phenoxymethylpenicillin prescribed to a patient with penicillin allergy Contraindicated
C. Contraindications (including age, gender and condition)
C1 Aspirin 300 mg tablet to be taken every 6 h when required (112 tablets),
prescribed to a child of 14 years
Contraindicated in children <16 years; Reye’s syndrome
C2 Acrivastine 8 mg capsule to be taken three times daily (84 capsules) prescribed
to an elderly patient of 70 years
Contraindicated; may be more sensitive to side-effects, especially drowsiness
C3 Finasteride prescribed to a female patient Finasteride is not indicated for use in women or children
C4 Methotrexate prescribed in pregnancy Contraindicated
C5 Propranolol 10 mg tablet to be taken four times daily (112 tablets) prescribed
to a patient with asthma who is on salbutamol
β-Blockers, including those considered to be cardioselective (e.g. propranolol), should
usually be avoided in patients with a history of asthma or bronchospasm
D. Dose check
D1 Diclofenac sodium 50 mg tablet to be taken four times daily (112 tablets) The daily dose of 200 mg is more than the maximum daily dose of 75–150 mg in
two to three divided doses recommended by the British National Formulary for
oral intake
D2 Methotrexate 2.5 mg tablets, 15 mg to be taken daily (42 tablets) Methotrexate dose is once weekly
E. Drug-route check
E1 Timolol eye drops prescribed to a patient with asthma who is on salbutamol British National Formulary states that β-blockers, even those with apparent
cardioselectivity, should not be used in patients with asthma or a history of
obstructive airways disease, unless no alternative treatment is available. In such
cases, the risk of inducing bronchospasm should be appreciated and appropriate
precautions taken
F. High-dose initiation of medicines and significant dose increase
F1 MST Continus 100 mg tablets prescribed to a patient who had 10 mg
recorded in the electronic patient medication record system
Significant dose increase
F2 Morphine sulfate solution 20 mg ml−1, 5 ml to be taken every 4–6 h when
required
High-dose initiation
Table 3
Clinical scenarios where an alert would not be expected
Test Dispensing scenario (alert expected = NO) Rationale
G1 Pravastatin prescribed to a patient who is already taking warfarin Unlike some statins, pravastatin is not known to affect the effect of anticoagulants. This
scenario checks whether interactions are picked up at drug class, product level or both
G2 Amoxicillin prescribed to a patient who is on Microgynon Current recommendations issued by the Faculty of Sexual and Reproductive Health Care
Clinical Effectiveness Unit in January 2011 are that no additional contraceptive
precautions are required when combined oral contraceptives are used with
non-enzyme-inducing antibiotics, unless diarrhoea or vomiting occurs [26]
G3 Atenolol prescribed to a patient who is already taking amlodipine Calcium-channel blocker and β-blocker combination may be used to treat high blood
pressure or to relieve angina pain when either drug alone proves inadequate
G4* Atenolol 75 mg, once daily (28 day treatment) Requires dispensing of 25 mg and 50 mg tablets because the 75 mg product is not
commercially available. Maximum daily dose can be up to 200 mg depending on the
condition being treated
*Drug-doubling.
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was not displayed on screen when it was not expected.
The study was reviewed by the University of Nottingham,
Medical School Research Ethics Committee and was
given a favourable opinion. National Health Service
research and development permission was obtained from
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust.
Results
Five unique ePMR systems licenced for EPS R2 in England
were tested in the eight participating pharmacies, with a
sixth ePMR system assessed in a demonstration setting. All
the six ePMR systems assessed had safety features in them,
alerting users about potential hazardous situations. Four
of the eight participating pharmacies were using the same
ePMR system (System S2) at the time of the assessment;
the system responses observed in all four sites were the
same. No system produced the anticipated responses for
all of the 28 scenarios tested. Alerts were displayed in a
pop-upwindow (two systems), in a fixed area formessages
(one system), on a separate screen (one system) or as a
dual warning in both a pop-up window and in a fixed
message area (two systems).
The systems correctly identified themajority of hazard-
ous co-prescriptions and drug–drug interactions (Table 4).
Two of the ePMR systems identified all the 12 interactions
that were assessed in this category. Systems S1 and S2
failed to highlight the potential for digoxin toxicity when
co-prescribed with clarithromycin. Systems S2 and S3
failed to notify the user about potential hazards from
coincident prescribing of paracetamol, when generic
paracetamol and Tramacet (a product containing tram-
adol and paracetamol) were prescribed for the same
patient on subsequent days. System S6 did not highlight
the clinically significant interaction between fluoxetine
and St John’sWort. Further investigation of the settings for
S6 highlighted that St John’s Wort drug name was not
mapped to a physical product.
Table 5 shows the ability of the ePMR systems to
highlight drug-allergy issues, contraindications, inappro-
priate doses, drug-route suitability, issues with high-dose
initiation of medicines and significant dose increase
assessment.
None of the systems produced an alert for all the sce-
narios. System S4 produced the most alerts (for four of the
12 scenarios), with system S1 providing an alert in only one
of the scenarios. None of the systems identified the poten-
tial allergy to Fluarix, and only S2 and S6 provided an alert
to the penicillin sensitivity. Further investigation of the
systems showed that in S4 and S5, drug allergy must be
recorded per product for allergy checking to take place.
With respect to checking for contraindications as a result
of age, gender or co-morbidity, a wide range of system
responses were observed. System S4 successfully alerted
for all of the scenarios presented, S1 did not alert for any of
the scenarios and the other systems alerted in less than
half of the scenarios. Systems S1, S2 and S5 informed
about nonsuitability of aspirin use (C1) in a child of 14
years of age by recording the information on the prescrip-
tion label or in the message area irrespective of the age of
the patient. System S3 did both. It was not possible to
record in S6 that a patient was pregnant (C4).
None of the systems identified the overdose of
diclofenac in D1. Five of the six systems provided a
warning about the use of methotrexate (D2); however, the
alert was provided irrespective of the frequency regimen
of methotrexate (weekly or daily). None of the ePMR
systems appeared to check the dosing frequency entered.
The alerts displayed in four of the ePMR systems were
based on the National Patient Safety Agency directive
regarding weekly dosing of oral methotrexate [26]. In S4,
Table 4
Hazardous co-prescriptions and interactions alert responses by electronic patient medication record systems (alert generated = Yes; no alert generated =
NO)
Test Dispensing scenario tested
Electronic patient medication record system
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
A1 Sildenafil prescribed to a patient who is also receiving a nitrate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A2 Ciprofloxacin prescribed to a patient who is taking ciclosporin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A3 Clarithromycin prescribed to a patient who is taking digoxin NO NO Yes Yes Yes Yes
A4 Erythromycin prescribed to a patient who is taking simvastatin, with no evidence that
the patient has been advised to stop the simvastatin whilst taking the antibiotic
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A5 Ibuprofen prescribed to a patient who is taking lithium carbonate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A6 Verapamil prescribed to a patient who is taking atenolol Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A7 Naproxen prescribed to a patient who is taking warfarin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A8 Tagamet prescribed to a patient who is taking warfarin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A9 Fluvastatin prescribed to a patient who is taking warfarin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A10 Microgynon prescribed to a patient who is on carbamazepine Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A11 St John’s Wort prescribed to a patient who is taking fluoxetine Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NO
A12 Tramacet prescribed to a patient who is already taking paracetamol Yes NO NO Yes Yes Yes
Electronic patient medication record systems
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the weekly regimenwas advised in the counselling section
of the ePMR software; however, this was contrary to the
specific alert layout recommendations of the National
Patient Safety Agency. No alert was provided by S3.
Scenario E1 was similar to C5; β-adrenoceptor blocking
drugs (in this case, timolol eye drops) should not be used
in asthmatic patients (even when administered as eye
drops). Unlike C5, where five of the systems correctly
alerted the user, for E1 four of the systems failed to warn
the dispenser about the potential for harm. Scenarios F1
and F2 were concerned with instances where patients
should either be started on a lowdose of themedication or
should have doses changed gradually. None of the six
systems tested provided any warning when presented
with these scenarios.
Table 6 shows the results when systems were tested to
assess whether unnecessary alerts were provided. Many
statins interact with warfarin; however, pravastatin has
been shown not to interact. In G1, four of the systems
correctly showed no alert, but systems S3 and S5 incor-
rectly produced alerts. The scenario G2, involving the com-
bined oral contraceptive Microgynon and the antibiotic
amoxicillin, was included to assess whether new guidance
had been implemented to no longer warn against con-
comitant non-enzyme-inducing antibiotic use with com-
bined oral contraceptives [27]. Three ePMR systems
presented an alert contrary to the revised guidance. Sce-
nario G3 looked at the co-prescribing of two antihyperten-
sive drugs, a very common, and usually appropriate,
practice in patients with high blood pressure. Three of the
Table 5
Responses by electronic patient medication record systems in relation to drug allergies, contraindications, inappropriate doses, drug-route suitability,
high-dose initiation of medicines and significant dose increase (alert generated = Yes; no alert generated = NO)
Test Dispensing scenario tested
Electronic patient medication record system
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
B. Drug allergy
B1 Fluarix vaccine prescribed to a patient with egg allergy NO NO NO NO NO NO
B2 Phenoxymethylpenicillin prescribed to a patient with penicillin allergy NO Yes NO NO NO Yes
C. Contraindications (including age, gender and condition)
C1 Aspirin prescribed to a child of 14 years NO NO Yes Yes NO NO
C2 Acrivastine prescribed to an elderly patient of 70 years NO NO NO Yes NO NO
C3 Finasteride prescribed to a female patient NO NO NO Yes NO NO
C4 Methotrexate prescribed in pregnancy NO NO NO Yes Yes NO
C5 Propranolol prescribed to a patient with asthma who is on salbutamol NO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
D. Dose check
D1 Diclofenac tablets prescribed above the maximum daily dose recommended by the British
National Formulary
NO NO NO NO NO NO
D2 Methotrexate prescribed on a daily basis Yes Yes NO Yes Yes Yes
E. Drug-route check
E1 Timolol eye drops prescribed to a patient with salbutamol already in the patient medical record NO NO Yes NO Yes NO
F. High-dose initiation of medicines and significant dose increase
F1 MST Continus 100 mg tablets prescribed to a patient who had 10 mg tablets recorded in the
electronic patient medication record system
NO NO NO NO NO NO
F2 Morphine sulfate concentrated oral solution prescribed to an opiate-naïve patient NO NO NO NO NO NO
Table 6
Responses by electronic patient medication record systems in clinical scenarios where an alert would not be expected (alert generated = Yes; no alert
generated = NO)
Test Dispensing scenario tested
Electronic patient medication record system
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
G1 Pravastatin prescribed to a patient who is already taking warfarin to investigate whether electronic
patient medication record alerts are attached to individual drugs or whether they are applied at the
class level
NO NO Yes NO Yes NO
G2 Amoxicillin prescribed to a patient who is on Microgynon to see whether systems were being updated
in line with more recently updated guidance
Yes NO Yes NO NO Yes
G3 Atenolol prescribed to a patient who is already taking amlodipine NO NO Yes NO Yes Yes
G4* Atenolol 75 mg (25 mg + 50 mg), once daily (28 day treatment) NO NO NO Yes NO NO
*Drug-doubling.
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systems produced alerts about the use of two similarmedi-
cines, whereas three did not. The prescribing of two
strengths of the same medicine to achieve a dose not
available as a single tablet was tested in G4. Five of the
systems appropriately produced no alert.
Discussion
The results suggest that current ePMR systems have some
deficiencies with respect to highlighting clinical hazards
such as drug–drug interactions, co-prescriptions, allergies,
contraindications and inappropriate dosing. Although
some progress has been made in the development of
ePMR systems over the years, there is still a long way to go
in bringing the systems up to the level of performance that
is now required in clinical practice.
The tests described in Table 1 assessed the perfor-
mance of ePMR systems with respect to checking drug–
drug interactions and hazardous co-prescriptions. All of
the medicines a patient receives from a pharmacy are
recorded in the ePMR system, so the information is gener-
ally readily available to perform these safety checks.
However, this is only the case when patients use the same
pharmacy. Nevertheless, there would appear to be some
cases where known drug–drug interactions are not
warned against. If pharmacists rely on the ePMR system to
identify these hazardous events, then this is a concern for
patient safety. This study was not designed to identify the
reasoning behind these events being missed, and further
work would be needed to understand why this was the
case.
Pharmacists are considered to be experts in medicines
and, as well as being aware of specific drug interactions,
they are also required to ensure that medicines are used
safely based on other key parameters, such as allergies,
co-morbidities and issues associated with the age and
gender of the patient. The ePMR systems had highly vari-
able performance when checking for issues other than
drug–drug interactions. In many cases, few or none of
the systems identified the potentially hazardous prescrib-
ing. Often, the pharmacist has available only the informa-
tion presented on the prescription and in the ePMR
system along with the information provided by the
patient.
In the tests relating to information that could have
been provided either from the prescription or from the
patient medication record, some of the systems tested
were unable to record the required information, such as
allergy status, thus preventing appropriate checks being
made by the ePMR system. In one instance, allergies could
be recorded but these are required to be identified against
each medicine; for example, a patient with a penicillin
allergy would require an allergy marker being placed
against each type of penicillin-based medicine (of which
at least six are routinely used in community practice in
England). Where allergies could be recorded, none of the
systems identified the potential issues with the Fluarix
vaccine.
The responses to items prescribed inappropriately to
patients based on their age were commonly absent, with
only one system correctly identifying both hazardous
events. All computer-generated prescriptions now include
both the age and date of birth, which can also be verified
easily by the patient at the point of dispensing. With this
availability, it is surprising that the facility for the ePMR
system to verify appropriateness based on age is not gen-
erally present.
Our tests showed that the alert for oral methotrexate
appeared irrespective of the frequency entered on the
label, potentially allowing hazardous daily dosing to be
overlooked because this warning appears whether the fre-
quency is correct or not. There was no alert in S3, perhaps
due to oversight, lack of awareness of the existence of the
National Patient Safety Agency recommendation, or other
reasons best known to the pharmacy software vendor
company.
In relation to prescribing of morphine, none of the
systems alerted to the hazardous practice of initial pre-
scribing of a high dose of medicines to patients or making
sudden increases in dose. Given the potential for opioids,
such as morphine sulfate, to cause harm to patients [4],
high initiation dose and sudden dose increase should alert
the user of the system to enable appropriate collaborative
management of this potential clinical hazard to take place
between the pharmacist and the prescriber and, where
relevant, in conjunction with the patient.
It has been reported that alert fatigue can occur when
excessive alerts are presented, potentially resulting in
important alerts being ignored by the end user [28, 29]. In
the tests to check the potential for overalerting, two of the
six systems in test G1 triggered unnecessary alerts, sug-
gesting that some systems generate alerts at the drug class
level rather than the individual drug level, which may lead
to an overpresentation of warnings. Three of the six
systems in test G2 provided unnecessary warnings about
the use of Microgynon with amoxicillin. This suggests that
some systems are not updated in a timely fashion when
new guidance becomes available.
Implications for policy and practice
Policy The results of this study have shown that all of the
ePMR systems have inadequacies and do not always
produce the same alerts. Given that the ePMR system is
intended to be a core element of the service provision in
pharmacy, it would seem appropriate for the information
to be consistent across systems. At present there is no core
specification for the types and content of safety features in
ePMR systems in the UK, and there is an urgent need to
produce one.
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Practice With no core specification and standard system
response, it falls to the clinical knowledge of the pharma-
cist to ensure that all of the items they dispense are clini-
cally appropriate and safe. Many pharmacists work in one
pharmacy, but there are some who work in different phar-
macies providing cover for days off and holidays. As these
systems provide different responses to clinical situations,
the pharmacist needs to be fully aware of how the ePMR
system they are using will respond, if at all, in a given
situation. This work highlights the need for pharmacists
not to be over-reliant on ePMR systems.
Strengths and limitations
Strengths One of the strengths of this study is that we
tested six of the seven EPS R2 approved ePMR systems
available in practice in August 2012, representing almost
complete coverage of systems used in community phar-
macies in England. This study provides a picture of the
ability of ePMR systems and their safety features, in their
current state of maturity, to pick up potential clinical
hazards and medication errors during pharmacy order
entry. It is the first assessment of its type to look at the
safety aspects of ePMR systems approved for EPS R2, in the
community pharmacy setting in England.
Limitations This study was an assessment of the ability of
the systems to inform users about potentially hazardous
situations during order entry. It provides information
about the current state of maturity of the systems. The
assessment was not conducted as a specific test of the
sensitivity or specificity of the systems, because the under-
lying algorithms were not reviewed. It also did not look at
how pharmacy professionals react to safety alerts or how
they perceive them in practice. Further research would be
needed to address these issues.
It is noteworthy that some of the scenarios used in the
assessment may, on occasion, be violated for a specific
patient; for example, when treatment is started by a spe-
cialist consultant in secondary care for continuation in
primary care. It was not the intention of this study to allow
for these situations, thereby focusing onmore routine pre-
scribing in general practice.
Conclusions
The performance of the ePMR systems tested was variable
and suboptimal. The findings suggest the need for
minimum specifications and standards for ePMR systems
to ensure consistency of performance.
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